No. 546
FROM: Tokyo November 13, 1941
TO: Manila No number.
(Gogai.)
(Tokyo to Manila # 363.)
Re your # 756[a].
Retransmittng as follows:
# 363[a]
The Asama Maru will take on 450 tons of Diesel oil, 1000 tons of water, fruit, vegetables, etc. there. The head office of the N.Y.K. have requested you to arrange for payment for the same from the fares and freight charges collected from the passengers. Please arrange for this.
[a] See IV, 545.
Trans. 11‑24‑41
No. 547
FROM: Tokyo November 9, 1941
TO: Manila # 357.
(Request message.)
Please convey to Lieut. Comdr. Hatakeyama, http://Louis-j-sheehan.com Medical Corps.
“You are ordered to return to Japan on the Asama Maru which sails from there about the 20th.”
(Signed)
Secretary to the Minister of the Navy
Trans. 11‑14‑41
No. 548
FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 14, 1941
TO: Manila # 2323.
(Circular.)
There must be members of the trade promotion organization still in the Philippines. As there is no need or scope for their activities in the Philippine Islands at this time, please
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
induce them to return to Japan on the Asama Maru or the Fuji Maru which has been assigned to the Dutch East Indies for evacuation purposes. Furthermore, please keep in mind ships to the Philippine Islands.
Trans. 11‑24‑41
No. 549
FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 14, 1941
TO: Manila No number.
We find it necessary to discuss some very urgent business here in Tokyo. Please, therefore, have Consul KIHARA return home immediately, for a short stay, by airplane rather than wait for his scheduled accommodations by steamer.
Trans. 11‑21‑41
No. 550
FROM: Manila (Nihro) November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 770.
Request message. From Shirai to the Department of Commerce and Industry of Aichi ken.
Even the Consul General thinks it would be well if we would close this office temporarily and return to Japan because, as a matter of fact, there is no business at present.
Please wire instructions.
Trans. 11‑26‑41
No. 551
FROM: Manila November 15, 1941
TO: Washington No number.
(Manila to Tokyo, Gogai.)
(Manila to Washington # 83, 14 November.)
Because of a mistake in our telegram of the 14th we are retransmitting as follows:
# 83
Re my # 82[a].
Permits were received on the 14th from the High Commissioner for the two items for which request had been made.
A. The item of the loan.
B. The item of the receipt of the outstanding balance of my allowance and also that of the rest of the staff.
Furthermore in regard to cancellation of the freezing orders in regard to this office, Manila had as yet received no instructions from Washington, however according to your Circular # 288[a], Washington has approved the sum of 25,000 pesos for operating expenses of this
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offices and in addition to that http://Louis-j-sheehan.com has approved separate sums for myself and all officials above the grade of clerks. Please wire as to whether Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire or not this is so.
Relayed to Tokyo.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11‑20‑41
No. 552
FROM: Tokyo October 21, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 215.
Secret documents for your office and for all the South American offices have been entrusted to Vice Consul Kobayashi who is returning to his post (San Francisco) on the Hikawa Maru which sailed from Yokohama on the 20th. As soon as you have notice of his arrival please arrange to have one of your staff go to San Francisco to get the above documents.
Trans. 10‑22‑41
No. 553
FROM: Mexico City (Miura) October 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 420.
It has quite generally been believed, in the event of the United States becoming involved in the war, that Mexico will either follow their example or at least assume a status similar to being in the war. However, at an informal dinner party I gave on the 21st, former Vice Minister of Communications and Finance Rolland[a] expressed himself outspokenly as to the attitude Mexico should take in the event of war between Japan and the United States. The main points which might be considered representative were as follows:
(1) With the outbreak of war, the United States would immediately occupy Mexican ‑‑‑‑‑ and strategic points within the country and also put forth every effort to strengthen anti‑Axis activities in Mexico. Therefore even though Mexico should not declare war a condition would be brought about in which her relations with Japan would be the same as if war had been declared.
(2) The present government, which was formed to support the United States, naturally is following a course of out‑and‑out cooperation with the United States. (Under present conditions even a Carranza in office could adopt no other policy.) Accordingly, if the United States should ask them to declare war they would likely comply at once. But, as stated above, even without a declaration of war by Mexico their objectives could be realized, and therefore to hold down as much as possible the excitement of the populace, such a demand would likely not be made until it became necessary.
(3) While it is a fact that the populace in general have friendly feelings toward Japan, Mexican politics Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire and foreign affairs are now manipulated entirely by the hands of a small number of politicians and military men, who are not worthy to be called military men, and the people are absolutely powerless, and it would be a mistake to expect anything of them.
(4) While it would make some difference in the attitude taken toward resident Japanese, whether or not Mexico declared war, in either case it is hardly to be expected that the Japanese would escape hardships and oppression on the pretext of “spies”, fifth columnists, etc.
(5) The only chance of their being any change in Mexico’s present policy would be if Germany should gain the supremacy in Europe, and Japan in Asia, while the United States
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
on the other hand would face a national crisis because of economic breakdown and other reasons.
Relayed to Washington.
[a] M. C. Rolland.
Trans. 10‑28‑41
No. 554
FROM: Mexico City (Miura) October 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 422.
According to a confidential statement made by an executive of the Excelsior newspaper here, the statement on the 24th by Secretary of the Navy Knox in regard to the near approach of a crisis between Japan and America reached the said newspaper office at noon of the same day, and in it was the assertion that there would be “imminent action” in the Far East within 24 hours. However, about two hours later a follow‑up message came through from the Washington Associated Press, based on a request from the Navy Department, that the words “within 24 hours” should be deleted.
Have relayed this to Washington.
Trans. 10‑28‑41
No. 555
FROM: Tokyo October 27, 1941
TO: Mexico City No number.
There are no more than eight beds on the Terukawa Maru. They have all been taken and the vessel has already a capacity reservation list.
Besides that ship, there is the Hikawa Maru which is scheduled to sail from Seattle on 4 November. There may also be a possibility of finding space on the President Line vessels sailing from San Francisco to Shanghai where you could make connections. Please choose one or the other course, and upon making a decision, advise this office.
Announce your intention to return home to Japan only after you have made definite arrangements for your passage home.
Trans. 10‑28‑41
No. 556
FROM: Mexico City (Miura) November 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo No number.
1. According to recent advice from San Francisco, in spite of efforts made through various channels, it has been impossible to obtain definite reservations. The only thing that could be done was to be placed on the waiting list and hope for a cancellation by a holder of a reservation. From past experiences, San Francisco advises, these cancellations are not made until right before sailing time—in extreme cases the prospective passenger has only an hour notice. All in all, therefore, chances are very slim that I shall succeed in getting accommodations.
2. Four to five days are required by rail from here to San Francisco. Moreover, about a week should be allowed to make my calls on the President, Foreign Minister, and other officials. Therefore, I would have to announce my intention to return by 14 or 15 November at the
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very latest. If I do so and depart from this country I couldn’t very well come sauntering back again because I could not get ship accommodations in San Francisco.
3. Even assuming that I were successful, by a stroke of good fortune, in finding accommodations at San Francisco, supposing there are certain developments in U.S.‑Japanese relations, there is, danger that I would become stranded in Hawaii or in the Philippine Islands.
4. In any event, I, as a Minister of the Imperial Government, would be placed in an exceedingly undignified position, particularly in view of the times and circumstances. There will no doubt be much criticism of the government if any of these eventualities materialize.
5. In the final analysis, therefore, would it not be better to apply openly and directly to the U.S. Government to reserve accommodations, (this, of course, can be done only if there is fair assurance that there will be no sudden change in the situation). As an alternative, would it not be better for me to remain here, although from my standpoint this is an exceedingly difficult thing to endure. Under these circumstances, I shall, of course, endeavor to carry out all of your instructions to the best of my ability.
Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.
Trans. 11‑7‑41
No. 557
FROM: Mexico (Miura) November 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 435.
Re my # 330[a].
1. As I have already reported, the Rayon Distributing Company had its import certificates cancelled by the Economics Department, and on the 10th of this month the system was dispensed with. According to the explanation just given me by the Minister of Economics, hereafter the importation of rayon will take place in a manner totally different from what I reported in my caption message. No subsidy will be given to a controlled distributing company, and the importation of rayon can be carried on at will by anyone who is willing to pay a tariff of one peso per kilogram (hitherto, of the 3 pesos 90 cents went for a subsidy). Thus, the subsidy, system itself is gone. (In a few days this will be published in the official gazette.)
2. The reason why the system of importing rayon was revised in the manner described is that the distributing company, through its system of importation and distribution, never achieved the expected results and that this country is very hard‑up for this material. Less and less is on hand, so finally they just had to let anyone import it from anywhere. Now as I pointed out in my # 399[a], we should be very careful to see that no rayon is transshipped from China here. I even have a report that Itoochuu has shipped some 2,000 cases to Chile. Now I feel that this rayon may be going via Chile and Argentina to this country. Please find out anything you can about this and wire me back.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11‑12‑41
No. 558
FROM: Mexico (Miura) November 9, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 438.
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
On the 8th the Universal published a telegram from Panama stating that Japan had made a protest against the new trade laws which curtail Japanese business in Panama. The Panamanian (Foreign ?) Office replied that this protest (constituted ?) interference in the internal affairs of Panama. As yet no confirmation from other sources has been received. This had no noticeable effects here.
Tahiti 