Trans. 11‑20‑41
No. 994
FROM: Shanghai November 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 2182.
It is said that there are now over ten armies in Yunnan. CHIANG KAI‑SHEK is making peace with the Central Communist party. There are supposed to be 400 American planes and more than 300 volunteer pilots on the Tenmen Route.
Trans. 12‑9‑41
No. 995
FROM: Shanghai November 10, 1941
TO: Net Circular # 970.
(Message to Tokyo # 2058.)
I received a telegram from JK today that says that CHUNGKING, through certain of its representatives is negotiating for peace with Japan in order to fool us. It seems that the object is to make us slow up our progress and to bring up stronger resistance.
Sent to Hong Kong.
Trans. 11‑13‑41
No. 996
FROM: Shanghai November 13, 1941
TO: Peking Circular # 981.
Shanghai to Tokyo # 2082.
RATIMOA [a] gave an official report from his government to Chiang Kai‑Shek as follows: The reason that America agreed to enter into a negotiation with Kurusu regarding American‑Japanese relations, was to arrange for an agreement between Japan and the United States for only a certain period, and there will be no change in the future Far Eastern policy of America.
Also, although there is a rumor abroad that the United States made special preparations for the airplane which carried Kurusu to the United States, this is not the case, and it is only a rumor started as part of Japan’s propaganda.
[a] Latimore ?
Trans. 11‑20‑41
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 997
FROM: Tokyo (The Foreign Minister) November 14, 1941
TO: Hong Kong (The Japanese Consul‑General) Circular # 2319.
(To be treated as Chef de Mission cypher. Not to be divulged to persons outside the Department.)
Although the Imperial Japanese Government is making a last effort in the Japanese-American negotiations, the outlook does not permit of optimism. If the negotiations end in failure one may expect a sudden change in that part of the international situation which revolves ’round Japan. To meet that eventuality, the following special measures in regard to China, which is the crux of the question for Japan, have already been decided at a Cabinet Council:
(a) The complete expulsion of British and American military and naval strength in China.
(b) Bring completely under our power the enemy concessions and enemy important interests in China (Maritime Customs, mines, etc.).
(c) Seize as required such enemy interest in China as are connected with the National Government.
In effecting these measures towards China our Foreign Office will take every care to avoid exhaustion of the national strength, and it is, therefore, our fundamental policy to make sure that we have enough war potential to face up to a lengthy world‑war, and to make plans to meet a future diminution in military strength. We must, therefore, be careful to lighten as far as possible the burden on our manpower and on our material resources. Louis J. Sheehan, EsquireWe must also encourage as much as possible the activities of Chinese leaders in occupied territories and thus possess ourselves of the popular sentiment on the basis of Japanese-Chinese cooperation. Thus, while making peace a reality in those areas under our power, in our economic relations with China great stress will be laid on the acquisition of commodities (especially from unoccupied territories). For this reason stress has been laid on a reasonable adjustment of existing limitations, and it is with this in view that all these (? points ?) have been decided.
As regards the foregoing, as there is a precedent in the event of freezing of funds, a special telegram on this has been sent to you for your information. You should, however, keep absolutely secret from persons outside the Department the existence of the decisions notified above and the fact that you have received a communication on the subject.
This telegram is addressed to Nanso [a] (Gaishin) [a], Hokudai [a], Shanghai, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Hankow, Canton, Hong Kong.
Hokudai [a] will circulate to Chang Kiakow and Tayuan.
Tsingtao will circulate to Sainan [a] (? Hsinan ?).
Canton will circulate to Amoy.
The above circulation should be effected without delay.
TOGO.
[a] Kana.
No trans. date.
No. 998
FROM: Nanking October 18, 1941
TO: Berlin # 5.
Re your # 7 [a].
A-455
At first it appeared that there were only two weeks to prepare for the sailing of the Asama Maru, so I could not line up all the officials to take office in Europe. However, I am now hurrying and have put the personnel you mentioned in order. LI SHENG-WU is at present Chief of the Education Department. When he was appointed he could not leave in too big a hurry because it would have upset the personnel of his office too much, so two First Secretaries in his service were appointed and we were going to send them. However, I talked it over with some high officials and we decided that they had had too little contact with Japan and too little experience in politics for such an important mission. Therefore, we decided to have LI FANG, Minister to Rumania, also fill the post of Commercial Attaché in Berlin and named a Charge to take his place. After Minister LI FANG presents his credentials, he will take up residence in Berlin.
LI FANG has long been an associate of Chief WANG. He has always endeavored to fight Communism and is a great friend of Germany’s. We have been in touch with him since long before the incident. It was on my recommendation that he was appointed. As for the matter of a Charge taking office, the Chief of the Foreign Section has already gotten an understanding with Acting Ambassador FISCHER. Rumania does not have a full- time Minister here so there can be no objection.
Well, the Nanking Government is now pressed for personnel, particularly in the Foreign Section, so this is the best the People’s Government could do. However, when LI FANG takes office, I want you please to give him plenty of instruction.
Relayed to Tokyo.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 10-21-41
No. 999
FROM: Berlin October 20, 1941
TO: Nanking #8.
Ambassador STAHMER [a] and Minister Boltze [b] (each unaccompanied) left here the 18th bound for their new posts via South America. (They expect to arrive in Pernambuco the 23rd.) They expect to stop over in Tokyo for about two weeks. After they arrive at their posts while —– —– —– —–, I want you to use your good offices in arranging various and sundry matters for them, in particular, convenient arrangements with regard to living quarters.
[a] Newly appointed Ambassador to the Nanking Government.
[b] Newly appointed Minister to the Nanking Government.
Trans. 10-22-41
No. 1000
FROM: Nanking October 20, 1941
TO: Net Circular # 320.
Message to Tokyo as # 741.
Re my # 735 [a].
On the 19th LIN PAI-SHENG, Chief of the Propaganda Section, spoke confidentially to a member of my staff as follows: “At first the general resignation of the KONOE cabinet
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
shocked the People’s Government. However, the appointment of General TOJO, who has long understood clearly the position of the People’s Government and who has worked for a settlement of the China Incident, has reassured us. We know that he will devote himself to the effecting of a brilliant national policy. Therefore, although the People’s Government had considered making some statement about the establishment of the new cabinet, we have now decided that any declaration of ours might be too forward and superfluous, casting suspicions on us, so we have declined to make any official statement at all.”
Relayed to Peking, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Hsinking.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 10-23-41
No. 1001
FROM: Canton October 22, 1941
TO: Nanking, Shanghai, Peking Circular # 227.
{Message to Tokyo # 433.)
The recent resignation of the Konoye Cabinet at first caused a great shock and uneasiness to such high officials of the Chiang Government as are in this area, however, as soon as the Tojo Cabinet made its appearance people here came to the conclusion that it was a Cabinet which would break the deadlock in Japanese American negotiations succeed the influence of the Chungking Government, which is backed up by the United States, will extend hither [a]. If they fail, Japanese military operations in China will be reduced and the Japanese forces will leave Central and South China. In either case the Nanking Government will suffer. Such is the pessimistic view entertained here. All lower class Chinese consider that the present change in administration makes war between Japan and the United States inevitable. They feel that this will give CHIANG KAI-SHEK a chance to wage a counter offensive. They are all gloomy thinking that if such a war occurs its conclusion will be far off.
Relayed to —–, Peking. Mailed to Hong Kong.
[a] DoD Comment: Sentence as in original translation.
Trans. 10-24-41
No. 1002
FROM: Tokyo October 20, 1941
TO: Peking #590
Though I shall handle the matter of partial revision within the law of temporary control of currency as you indicated in your secret wire # 1077 [a] dated September 19th, and in your letter of instructions, I want to do it in such a way as to be in complete accord with the control by Chinese authorities. Therefore, after you have delivered it to the Chinese authorities please wire me of their remarks and what you think would be the best plan for the present.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 10-22-41
A-457
No. 1003
FROM: Nanking October 31, 1941
TO: Peking #333.
Nanking to Tokyo #771.
(Abstract.)
A conference was held to discuss the fall of the legal tender’s value. Many are of the opinion that it should be kept at a certain rate, but thus far no agreement as to when to put this into effect. Another meeting is to be held the 4th.
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 1004
FROM: Nanking October 22,1941
TO: Tokyo # 746.
(Message to Hong Kong # 167.)
Re your wire # 65 [a] to Shanghai.
Since the beginning of July, the following newspapers for enlightening the Chinese‑‑Chūō Denji (Central Telegraphic News), Chiūhō (Central News), Minkoku Nippo (Republic Daily News), Zen-Nankin Shimpo (Old Nanking Newspaper), and Tsuka Nippo (Transit Daily News)-are being sent out by ordinary mail with three days’ issues packed together in large envelopes. We have stopped sending them sealed.
However, copies addressed to Singapore, Siam, Saigon, and Hanoi go in care of our military authorities there, and those for Manila only we are still sending through the facilities of this department.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 10-24-41
No. 1005
FROM: Nanking October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo Extra # 13 (or 19).
(Strictly secret. To be handled in Government Code.)
Your wire of the 21st received. When I come to Tokyo I hope to have a talk with you. I want to come to Japan by any boat available about the (13 ?) of November accompanied by SHIMIZU (a secretary), TSUTSUJI (attached to the department), and one under-secretary. I hope this suits you.
I am bringing along SHIMIZU so that he can tell you directly details of the political intrigues which he is commencing here.
Trans. 10-24-41
No. 1006
FROM: Rome October 28, 1941
TO: Tokyo #689.
A-458
THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(Intelligence of Secondary Importance.)
I have an intelligence report from the Vatican saying that Apostolic Delegate ZANIN at Peking has sent a communication to the Vatican to the effect that the Chungking Government has notified him through the Catholic Bishop of Chungking that CHIANG’s Government will have nothing to do with that of WANG. Therefore, it will be impossible to recognize one delegate dispatched to both governments. Consequently, unless the Nanking Government is left unrepresented, hereafter no apostolic envoy to China will be recognized. In this case, Catholic interests in the sphere of the Chungking regime could not be guaranteed, so added the communiqué.
His Holiness figures that this is just a trick to force him to recognize Chungking as the real government of China, but now that China cannot get any help from the Soviet, the China affair will soon be over. Hence, this question will be settled automatically ere long. ZANIN is to stay with the WANG people, and the Bishop of Chungking will continue to take care of Catholic interests in that area without being given the status of Apostolic Delegate. I think we ought to investigate and find out whether or not this report is true. Please do what you can and wire me back what you find out.
Trans. 10-30-41
No. 1007
FROM: Rome November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 700.
Re my # 661 [a] and # 689 [b], last part.
It goes without saying that the Vatican pays particular attention to the sources of its secret information in view of the fact that it is the target of the propaganda of the various nations. I sent my caption telegram with this in mind, feeling that this was an excellent opportunity of ascertaining the accuracy of the secret informer. Inasmuch as this is absolutely essential in regard to our future machinations, please make investigations and wire the results.
[a] See III, 955.
[b] See IV, 1006.
Trans